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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
old doctrines and distinctions are simply not adequate to meet the
needs of the changing technology of the building industry and the
corresponding needs of purchasers. A realistic appraisal will reveal
that the doctrine of implied warranty offers a solution to a growing
problem.
RiCHARD L. BURROWS
Securities Regulation-'"Fraud" to Include Nondisclosure
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 makes it
unlawful for an investment adviser, by the use of the mails or
facilities of interstate commerce, "(1) to employ any device, scheme,
or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client; (2) to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client... ."I Section
209(e) of the Act gives the Securities and Exchange Commission
the power to bring an action for injunction, and the district courts
power to enjoin such activities, when it has been shown that "any
person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or
practice constituting a violation of... [such] provision .... 2
Because of the general language of the antifraud provision quoted
above, it was not known what fraudulent and deceptive activities
were prohibited by this act or to what extent the Commission was
limited in this area by common law concepts of fraud and deceit,'
which would include proof of: (1) false representation of a material
fact; (2) an intent to induce reliance; (3) actual reliance on the false
representation; and (4) damage suffered as a result.
4
The meaning of the statute was clarified in the recent case of
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.5 The Commission
sought to obtain a preliminary injunction under section 206 to com-
pel an investment advisory service and its president to disclose to
the ground that the system was a fixture and therefore governed by the
applicable realty laws.
'lnvestment Advisers Act of 1940, §§206(l)-(2), 54 Stat. 852, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1963).
' Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 209(e), 54 Stat. 853, as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (Supp. IV 1963).
'S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960); H. REP. No. 2179,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1960).
'3 Loss, SEcuriTiES REGULATION 1430 (2d ed. 1961); S. REP. No. 1760,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1960).
375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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their clients a practice of buying securities just before advising their
purchase, and then selling them at a profit upon the price rise fol-
lowing the recommendation-commonly called "scalping." There
was no evidence in the case that "any misstatements or false figures
were contained in any of the bulletins," or that "the investment ad-
vice was unsound," or that "the defendants were being bribed to
tout a stock contrary to their beliefs," or that "these bulletins were
a scheme to get rid of worthless stock."6  Instead, the case was
premised wholly upon the fact that shortly before recommending them
to their clients, the defendants purchased shares of certain securities;
that following publication of the recommendations, there were small
rises in the market price of each of the stocks; that the defendants
then sold at a profit the shares previously purchased. In one instance
the defendants sold short7 shares of stock before commenting
unfavorably about that security, and then covered their short posi-
tion at a profit upon the resulting drop in market price.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that "scalping"
without disclosure to clients did not operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any client within the meaning of the act, since there was no
showing of intent to injure clients or actual injury to them." That
is, "fraud" was interpreted strictly, requiring intent to injure and
actual injury, both elements of common law fraud.
In reversing, the Supreme Court said that the defendants' activi-
ties created a potential conflict of interest, and held that the Com-
mission could get the injunction because "failure to disclose ma-
terial facts must be deemed fraud or deceit .... -" The Court
reviewed the history of the SEC acts and concluded that Congress
passed them with their antifraud provisions because the common law
remedies for fraud and deceit were ill-suited to be applied to securi-
ties transactions, due to the intangible nature of securities.' 0 To
effect the remedial purposes of the provisions, the Court said, they
should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexi-
"Id. at 185.
"The term 'short sale' means any sale of a security which the seller does
not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security
borrowed by, or for the account of the seller." SEC Rule 3b-3, 17 C.F.R.
240.3b-3 (1949).
'SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.
1962) (in banc), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
:375 U.S. at 200.
'0 Id. at 194-95. See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities
Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933).
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bly .... 11" The Court further said that one of the purposes of the
acts was "to substitute a philosophy of disclosure for the philosophy
of caveat emptor" and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry. 2 As a result of the status created
by the SEC acts, the Court reasoned, an investment adviser is a
fiduciary and has a duty to disclose material facts to its clients; fail-
ure to make such disclosure operates as a fraud upon its clients,
whether or not there is intent to injure or actual injury. The Court
felt that such disclosure would tend to preserve the climate of fair
dealing necessary to maintain public confidence in the securities in-
dustry and thus would be beneficial to the economy of the country.
Justice Harlan voiced the lone dissente2a maintaining that there
was a lack of proof that the defendants' investment advice was not
disinterested. It would seem, however, that "scalping" does create
interests for an investment adviser which would be in conflict with
those of his clients and which might influence his decisions in making
recommendations to them. For example, he might be tempted to
recommend a volatile stock which would respond more favorably to
his recommendation than would a more solid stock. Another con-
flict of interests might arise if, after having bought the stock, but
before having recommended it, he got unfavorable information re-
garding it, in light of which he would not have recommended it,
had he not already taken a position in that security; in such a sitUa-
tion, he might be tempted to go ahead and recommend it anyway.
A client might choose to follow the advice of an investment adviser
despite the possibility of such a conflict of interest. Nonetheless,
he should be given the information that a conflict does exist, so that
he can choose whether or not to ignore it, rather than be left com-
pletely in the dark. It would seem that the majority reached the
better result in saying that the fiduciary relationship between an in-
vestment adviser and his client requires disclosure in this situation,
despite the absence of an explicit provision requiring disclosure.
12b
Although justice Harlan's dissent is not predicated upon lack of
materiality, it conveys the impression that he felt the omissions in
the case to be immaterial. Such an opinion would necessarily prevent
him from agreeing with the majority. Since an investment adviser
11 375 U.S. at 195.
12 375 U.S. at 198.
12a 375 U.S. at 203.
12b 375 U.S. at 198.
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cannot be required to disclose everything about every security he
recommends, for practical reasons, his duty of disclosure must neces-
sarily be limited only to those facts which are material, even under
the most liberal reading of the act.
The principal case marks the first time that the Supreme Court
has held failure to disclose a material fact to be fraud under any of
the securities regulation acts. However, lower court and SEC de-
cisions have interpreted antifraud provisions similar to those in the
principal case to include such nondisclosure, although under facts
perhaps more conducive to a finding that there was actual intent to
defraud.:" A brief look at some of these cases might shed light on
the statutory interpretation in the principal case.
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC4 involved sales of stock by
customers' men at prices substantially above the over-the-counter
price, without disclosing that the sale price was above the market
price; there was conflicting testimony as to whether or not untrue
statements had been made regarding the market price. In a petition
to review an order which revoked the petitioner's registration as a
broker and dealer, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that
there need be no specific finding of whether or not the alleged state-
ments had been made, since the failure to reveal the markup was
both an omission to state a material fact and a fraudulent device,
thus violating section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.'" The
court said that the law of fraud knows no difference between express
misrepresentation on the one hand and implied misrepresentation on
the other.'
In another case, Hughes v. SEC, 7 the petitioner acted in a dual
" See, e.g., Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d
795, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 767 (1943); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99
F. Supp. 808 (1951), modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
' 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
1 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1958), which provides:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any instruments or means of transportation in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property
by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3)
to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
139 F.2d at 437.
174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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capacity of investment adviser and of broker and dealer. In such
capacity she sold her own shares to clients without fully disclosing
such things as the best price at which such securities could be
purchased in the open market and the cost to her of the securities
sold to such clients. In sustaining the revocation of the petitioner's
registration, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals relied on
express language in the Securities Act making unlawful "any omis-
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.... ."s The court also said that the acts
constituted violations of the antifraud sections of the 19339 and
19340 acts, and the regulations21 thereunder, as well as saying that
they were omissions to state facts necessary to clarify half-truths,
which was expressly made unlawful.
A third case, Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,22 involved a class
action on behalf of minority shareholders against the majority
shareholder of the corporation, charging that the defendant had
fraudulently deprived them of their rightful participation in the
liquidation of the corporation. The majority shareholder had
offered to buy the shares of the minority shareholders without dis-
closing facts which indicated the value of the stock to be much greater
than the price that the defendant offered to pay. In holding that the
defendant violated Rule X-10B-5 concerning corporate "insiders," '28
the district court said:
" Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a) (2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a) (2) (1958).
" Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§77q(a) (1958).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C.
§78j(b) (1958); § 15, as amended, 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §780 (1958).
21Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1949); Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15cl-2 (1949).
" 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d
369 (3d Cir. 1956).
" The rule, now denominated Rule lOb-5, declares it unlawful: "for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1949).
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Defendant's liability for non-disclosure is not based primarily
upon the provision of subparagraph 2-subparagraph 1 of the
Rule makes it unlawful "To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud" and subparagraph 3 outlaws "any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person...". The three subparagraphs of this
broadly remedial rule are mutually supporting and not mutually
exclusive as defendant contends. Defendant's breach of its duty
of disclosure accordingly can be viewed as a violation of all three
subparagraphs of the Rule, i.e., (1) a device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud; (2) an implied misrepresentation or misleading
omission; and (3) an act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud upon the plaintiffs.24
Although the above cases did not concern the provisions of the
Investment Advisers Act, they did concern provisions which are
almost identical to those in question. 5 As a matter of fact, the
antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act were modeled
from subsections (1) and (3) of section 17(a) of the Securities
Act,20 the same section from which Rule lOb-5 was copied.27 Thus
the decisions interpreting the provisions of section 17(a) and Rule
10b-5 should be applied with equal force in interpreting section 206
of the 1940 act. It should be noted, however, that each of the cases
involved partial nondisclosure, and not complete failure to disclose.
In 1962 the SEC imposed a penalty upon a stockbroker for non-
disclosure when he traded for discretionary accounts on information
concerning a dividend decrease received from a corporate insider
who was his business associate. That is, liability was imposed under
the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 for mere nondisclosure.
The decision, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.,2- has been hailed
as exemplifying a continuing expansion of the scope of liability un-
der Rule 10b-5."9
Although section 206 has now been amended so that it apparently
:'99 F. Supp. at 829.
2 For the text of Rule lOb-5, see note 23 supra; for the text of section
17(a), see note 15 supra.
" 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1515 (2d ed. 1961); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745, 753 (1961), aff'd on rehearing,
306 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962) (in banc), rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
"'JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS
793 (1963).
28 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961."E.g., Notes: 62 CoLuM. L. REV. 735 (1962); 75 HARV. L. REv. 1449
(1962); 48 VA. L. REV. 398 (1962); 71 YALE L.J. 736 (1962).
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covers "scalping," 3° the nearly unanimous approval by the Supreme
Court of the liberal interpretation of the provisions in this case
should certainly have an impact upon securities regulation in the
future. It should facilitate regulation of the industry, since broad
legislation-intended to be interpreted broadly-can be enacted with
reasonable assurance that its effect will not be unduly restricted by
marrow interpretation.
COWLES LIIPFERT
Torts-Ifdependent Contractors-Duty of Care
In Heldenfels v. Hernandez' an employee of the owner of
property on which construction work was being done brought action
against a paving subcontractor for injuries sustained by the employee
'when struck by a backing truck. The jury found that the subcon-
tractor failed to provide a flagman to warn the employee of the
backing truck but found no affirmative negligence. The Texas
court held that the plaintiff -was merely a licensee as to the subcon-
tractor and that it had breached no duty owed to the landowner's
employee by its failure to provide a flagman. Even though the
subcontractor owned no interest in the land, the court reasoned that
it became an occupant of the private premises for the purpose of the
construction work, and that although an occupier or owner of land
may owe to a licensee the duty to warn him of concealed hazardous
conditions, there is no duty to warn him of dangers on the land which
are not concealed.
Owners and occupiers of land have been given immunities con-
cerning the exercise of care which are not, as a general rule, available
to others. It may be broadly stated that an owner or occupier has
no duty of care toward a trespasser except the duty not to wilfully
injure him He has a duty toward licensees which includes a duty
to warn of concealed dangerous conditions of the premises of which
"0 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 206(4), added by § 9, 74 Stat. 887
(1960), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (Supp. IV 1963).
1366 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
'Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Hooker v. Routt
Realty Co., 102 Colo. 8, 76 P.2d 431 (1938); Previte v. Wanskuck Co., 80
R.I. 1, 90 A.2d 769 (1952). See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 27.1
(1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
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